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I Introduction
It is well documented that exit rates from unemployment and re-employment wages decline
with the duration of unemployment after controlling for worker observable characteristics.
Since Lancaster (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984), the empirical literature has em-
phasized that ex-ante unobserved heterogeneity (or sorting) accounts for a large part of
the decline in exit rates. According to this explanation, workers differ in terms of certain
time-invariant characteristics, which are unobservable to the econometrician and potentially
to recruiting firms, and this translates into differences in employment prospects. As a re-
sult, the average exit rates fall with the duration of unemployment because of variation in
the composition of the unemployed. Despite its quantitative importance, very little theo-
retical research has been performed to address this explanation. Lockwood (1991) was a
remarkable early exception, but re-employment wages were assumed to be constant in this
study. Gonzalez and Shi (2010) and Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Preugschat (2014) provided the-
oretical explanations of the duration dynamics of one of these two variables, but they were
not conclusive about the other variable. Furthermore, the explanation of sorting in these
three studies was somewhat circular because worker heterogeneity was modeled based on
exogenous differences in the likelihood of obtaining a job.
We consider a sorting mechanism based on productivity differences across workers, which
is consistent with falling exit rates and wages. We analyze a frictional labor market in which
workers are informed privately about skills and search is directed. These skills are treated
as abilities that recruiters cannot grasp either from a CV or an interview, but they can
be assessed on the job. An adverse selection problem arises if unskilled workers crowd
out skilled applicants. Thus, firms design self-selection schemes in equilibrium to separate
worker types in different submarkets. The sorting mechanism relies on two ingredients.
First, in the absence of screening devices, performance-contingent compensation plans are
a central feature of these sorting schemes, as noted in the literature in personnel economics
(e.g., Lazear and Shaw (2007)). In our study, performance-related pay is derived from the
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assumption that rents generated by a job-worker pair are split according to some exogenous
rule. Second, firms have the ability to commit to renting an input that is complementary in
terms of production to the skills of workers. We refer to that production input as capital or
machine quality.1 These linear renting costs together with the concavity of the production
technology make the surplus generated by a firm-worker pair be hump-shaped in capital.
Firms are ex-ante identical. In equilibrium, a mass of firms commits to renting the
machine quality that maximizes the surplus derived from a match with an unskilled worker.
Likewise, a continuum of firms commits to machines with higher quality because they and
skilled workers anticipate that their match would produce a larger surplus, and thus higher
wages and profits. Higher expected profits attract a relatively higher number of firms, so
they are associated with higher exit rates from unemployment. Therefore, the average exit
rate from unemployment and the average re-employment wage fall with duration because of
the variation in the composition of the unemployment pool.
It should be noted that due to the asymmetric information assumption and the hump
shape of the surplus function, unskilled workers face a trade-off between the more job op-
portunities that the skilled submarket offers and the higher wages they may obtain in the
unskilled submarket. In this setting, ex-ante commitment and directed search are crucial
for market segmentation because firms that target skilled workers may increase the machine
quality if necessary to discourage the unskilled from applying. This occurs because capital-
skill complementarity ensures that the losses associated with the capital increase are larger
for unskilled workers, thereby leaving the skilled as the only applicants.
The present study makes novel contributions in several areas. We build on Peters (1991)
and Moen (1997) by extending the competitive search literature to an economy in which
firms commit to machine quality instead of wage contracts. Moreover, this paper analyzes
the equilibrium allocation and its efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information, e.g.,
1We interpret machine quality in a generic manner as any set of inputs that are complementary in terms
of production to unobservable skills. For example, this set could contain co-workers, physical capital and
software (to the extent that the documented complementarities with the observable characteristics of the
labor input, mainly education, may be extended to the unobservable ones), or intermediate goods.
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similar to Michelacci and Suarez (2006) and Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010). Related
research is discussed in Section II.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III, the economy is
described. The equilibrium is characterized in Section IV. In Section V, the equilibrium
outcomes are analyzed. In Section VI, the conclusions are presented. Finally, the proofs are
provided in the Appendix and supplementary material is presented in an online Appendix.
II Related Literature
As mentioned above, other studies have also utilized a sorting mechanism to address the
negative duration dependence of exit rates and re-employment wages. In Lockwood (1991),
workers are also privately informed about their types, but firms have access to an imperfect
screening technology. To the best of our knowledge, this random search model was the first
investigation of a pure sorting mechanism in exit rates, although wages were assumed to
remain constant in duration. Gonzalez and Shi (2010) and Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Preugschat
(2014) considered economies with symmetric incomplete information regarding worker skills
and learning from unemployment duration in a competitive search framework. In these
settings, the mechanisms at work combined state-dependence and sorting effects. The exit
rates did not necessarily fall with duration in the former, whereas wages might not be
monotonic in the latter. Alternative mechanisms analyzed in previous studies belong to the
category known as state dependence. For example, Pissarides (1992) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2008) modeled human capital depreciation and search discouragement, while the
deterioration in social networks during unemployment was analyzed in Calvo´-Armengol and
Jackson (2004).
We build on the seminal work of Peters (1991) and Moen (1997) by analyzing a model
of the labor market where firms commit to machine quality instead of wage contracts to
attract applicants, and workers direct their own search. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) also
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analyzed an economy in which firms announce capital investment and wages are bargained
during meetings, but with identical workers.
The present study contributes to research into asymmetric information in the labor
market by exploring the dynamic consequences of capital-skill complementarity as well as
performance-based pay schemes. In a static setting, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) allowed
firms to post either single-wage job offers or wage-bargaining vacancies. We do not allow
firms to commit to single wages in the benchmark, but we inspect alternative contracting
spaces and constrained efficiency in the online Appendix. In Gale (1992) and Guerrieri,
Shimer, and Wright (2010), workers self-selected according to the disutility of work. The
former found that good workers work more hours and are better paid in the absence of
frictions. The latter showed that this result does not extend directly to a frictional labor
market because workers with a lower disutility from working have a higher employability
rate, although wages and working time comparisons were based on additional assumptions.
Furthermore, the set of assumptions employed by Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010)
does not hold in our model. In particular, their sorting assumption disqualifies any pooling
contract from being part of an equilibrium allocation since firms can always deviate and
deliver an arbitrarily small utility gain to the skilled workers and a strictly lower utility to
the unskilled. Instead, in our setting, pooling contracts do not participate in the equilibrium
because firms can increase profits by deviating to a higher machine quality, thereby attracting
only skilled applicants even if the skilled also obtain utility losses.
In terms of constrained efficiency, under perfect information, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
found that maximum welfare is attained in the market economy when firms commit to capital
and wages are negotiated if the Hosios condition holds, whereas Shi (2001) showed that the
equilibrium is constrained efficient if firms can post type-contingent offers. By contrast, with
asymmetric information, the equilibrium was not constrained efficient when the labor market
was segmented in Michelacci and Suarez (2006). In agreement with Guerrieri, Shimer, and
Wright (2010), we find that unskilled workers are detrimental to skilled workers if firms over-
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invest to discourage unskilled workers from applying for skilled jobs, which pushes down the
skilled wages and exit rates. A similar outcome was also reported in Moen (2003) and
Moen and Rosen (2005). The former analyzed a labor market with individual- and match-
specific productivity where firms only observed the overall productivity. In this setting, if
firms cannot commit to productivity-contingent wages, there are too few skilled jobs posted
in equilibrium and although the wage premium for skilled workers is larger than optimal,
their welfare reduces. The latter study considered a frictionless economy with asymmetric
information where firms offer performance-based pay to make workers invest greater effort
in their jobs. They showed that the equilibrium is separating, but not efficient, because too
much effort is induced in skilled jobs to separate types.
In contrast to previous research into assortative matching, the capital-skill complemen-
tarity assumption is sufficient to derive positive assortative matching (PAM) in equilibrium,
which is crucial for achieving falling wages in equilibrium. Shimer and Smith (2000) and
Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) showed that PAM requires stronger complementarity in a fric-
tional economy. This was also the case for Shi (2001) in a setting similar to ours, although
with perfect information on agent types and the capital investments made prior to matching.
In Section V, it is argued that a crucial difference compared with these previous studies is
that capital costs are incurred only while producing.
III Model
In this section, a frictional economy with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric information
about the worker type is described.
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a measure one of workers and a large
continuum of ex-ante identical firms. Free entry determines the mass of active firms in
equilibrium. Workers differ in their market skills. They can be either unskilled (type `) or
skilled (type h). There is a mass µ(s) of type s workers for s ∈ {`, h} and µ(`) + µ(h) = 1.
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The worker type is unobservable to the recruiting firms prior to production, but it can be
assessed on the job. Workers and firms are risk neutral and future payoffs are discounted at
a common rate r. The flow utility of unmatched workers is normalized to 0. Because of the
focus on the steady state equilibrium, time indices are suppressed for notational simplicity.
Let us denote the unemployment rate of type s workers at any instant.
Production. At any point in time, job-worker pairs with a machine of quality k produce
F (k, s) − ck units of net output, where c > 0 is the operating cost per quality unit. The
following assumptions are imposed on the production technology. First, capital is an essential
input, F (0, s) = 0. Second, the function F is increasing and concave in k. Note that the
monotonicity and concavity of function F together with the linear variable costs make the
net output a hump-shaped function of k. Third, skilled workers are more productive than
unskilled workers for any machine quality, i.e., F (k, `) < F (k, h) for k > 0. Fourth, the
following standard limit conditions hold: lim
k→0
Fk(k, s) = ∞ and lim
k→∞
Fk(k, s) = 0. Fifth,
capital and skills are complementary in production, i.e., Fk(k, `) < Fk(k, h).
To allow agents to engage in search and production activities, it is assumed that some
value k exists such that the net output F (k, `)−ck is sufficiently large relative to the effective
vacancy costs. Later, it is useful to refer to ks as the solution of the equation Fk(k, s) = c,
for s ∈ {`, h}. The assumptions on the production function F ensure the existence and
uniqueness of a solution to that equation, and that k` < kh. Note that ks maximizes the net
output produced by a type s worker.
Search and Matching: Bargaining. Firms create a job at cost c0 > 0. If a vacancy
is filled, a surplus S is generated due to the matching frictions detailed below. We consider
that wages are set ex-post through Nash-bargaining, but it is sufficient for now to assume
a constant labor share of the surplus, α. As in Michelacci and Suarez (2006), we treat
this as an institutional feature, and thus it is not contractible.2 However, in contrast to
2We discuss alternative contracting environments in the online Appendix.
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their setting, firms have the ability to commit to renting a machine quality k to attract
workers. Therefore, vacancies are identified by the machine quality. There are infinitely
many submarkets k ∈ K.3 A submarket where the firms and workers seek a trading partner
is said to be active. Let K ⊂ K denote the subset of active submarkets.
Let q(k) denote the ratio of workers relative to the vacancies created in submarket k. This
is refered to as the expected queue length for submarket k. This ratio must be consistent with
the optimizing behavior of the agents. Job-seekers and vacant firms rationally anticipate the
wage linked to the committed capital k. Search is directed in the sense that workers are
fully informed about vacancies and they apply for jobs that maximize their expected utility.
Agents rationally anticipate that higher wages are associated with higher job-filling rates
and lower job-finding rates. Note that due to the inverted U shape of the net output, higher
machine qualities do not translate monotonically into higher wages.
A firm fills its vacancy at the Poisson rate η(q(k)). In submarket k, workers of either type
find jobs at rate ν(q(k)) because of the assumption of asymmetric information regarding the
applicants’ skills. The equality ν(q(k)) = η(q(k))
q(k)
results from the fact that there is the same
number of newly employed workers as newly filled jobs at any instant. To improve readability,
the reference to the submarket is omitted, unless it is necessary. A number of standard
assumptions on the matching rates are made. Function η is increasing in q, which indicates
that it is easier to fill jobs in submarkets with more applicants per vacancy. Symmetrically, ν
is decreasing in queue length to capture the intuition that finding a job is more difficult when
workers are more abundant relative to vacancies. Furthermore, η and ν are twice continuously
differentiable functions, and the elasticity of the job-finding probability, ζ(q), is an increasing
function of the ratio. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, the following standard
boundary conditions are assumed: lim
q→∞
η(q) = lim
q→0
ν(q) =∞ and lim
q→0
η(q) = lim
q→∞
ν(q) = 0.
Furthermore, γ(k, s) is defined as the share of applicants of type s who search for jobs in
submarket k ∈ K. Let Γ(k) ≡ (γ(k, `), γ(k, h)) be a point of the simplex ∆1.
3As an abuse of language, but for the sake of notational simplicity, the letter k is used to refer indistinctly
to the machine quality and its associated submarket.
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Timing. The timing of the events is as follows. At the beginning of each instant,
firms hold one job, which can be either vacant or filled. Workers are either employed or
unemployed. There is potentially a continuum of submarkets indexed by a machine quality
k. Vacant firms enter a submarket to locate their vacancy. Then, unemployed workers
choose a submarket to search for a job. Matching, production, and wage-negotiation occur.
Job-termination shocks are idiosyncratic and they hit active pairs at the Poisson rate λ. The
worker becomes unemployed and the firm vanishes when shocks occur.
Value Functions. An unemployed worker of type s chooses the submarket that maxi-
mizes their utility. They become employed at rate ν(q) and obtain the value αSs(k).
rUs = max
k
ν(q(k))αSs(k) (1)
The surplus Ss(k) comprises the flow output net of the operating costs, as well as the net
of the search option if they are unemployed. This satisfies the following functional equation.
(r + λ)Ss(k) = F (k, s)− ck − rUs (2)
Firms choose a submarket to post their vacancies and maximize the expected profits. A
firm incurs a one-time cost of c0 when posting a vacancy in submarket k. The job is filled by
a worker of type s with probability η(q(k))γ(k, s). Then, the returns from a filled vacancy
are (1− α)Ss(k). Thus, the value of a vacant firm is defined by
rV = −c0 + η(q(k))
∑
s
γ(k, s)(1− α)Ss(k). (3)
Furthermore, the expected profits must be zero in any active submarket in equilibrium
because of free entry, V = 0.
IV Equilibrium
We now define the steady state equilibrium, which is a natural extension of the equilibrium
concept defined in the competitive search literature. We build upon the study of Guerrieri,
Shimer, and Wright (2010). Note that rational expectations for job offers off the equilibrium
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path must also be set to help recruiting firms maximize their profits. Thus, the queue length
Q(k) and type distribution Γ(k) must be defined for any submarket k ∈ K.
Definition 1 A steady state equilibrium consists of utility values {Us}s, surplus functions
Ss : K → R+, a set of active submarkets K ⊂ K, a distribution G of vacancies across
submarkets with support K, a queue length function Q : K → R+, and a type-share function
Γ : K → ∆1 such that the following apply.
1. The surplus value Ss satisfies the functional equation (2).
2. Profit-maximization condition and free-entry condition.
∀k ∈ K, η(Q(k))
∑
s
γ(k, s)(1− α)Ss(k) ≤ c0; and with equality if k ∈ K.
3. Workers search optimally for jobs. For all s ∈ {`, h},
rUs = max
k∈K
ν(Q(k))αSs(k), and ν(Q(k))αSs(k) ≤ rUs, ∀k ∈ K.
Furthermore, if k is such that γ(k, s) > 0 and Q(k) > 0, then ν(Q(k))αSs(k) = rUs.
If Ss(k) < 0, then either Q(k) = 0 or γs(k) = 0.
4. Resource constraint for labor.∫
K
γ(k, s)Q(k)dG(k) = usµ(s), ∀s ∈ {`, h}
Firms set a job and choose a machine quality to maximize their profits. Because of free
entry, the expected discounted profits are zero in equilibrium. Workers direct their search
to maximize their expected discounted utility. The last condition ensures that, for a given
type, the sum of job seekers across submarkets equals the total mass of unemployed.
The third equilibrium condition determines the rational expectations about the probabil-
ity of filling a vacancy off the equilibrium path. The expected number of applicants per firm
in an inactive submarket is determined by the maximum queue length that allows each type
of worker to obtain their market utility Us. Let us use a trembling-hand type of argument
to provide an intuition. Consider an arbitrarily small mass of firms, which deviate from the
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equilibrium allocation and post their vacancies in submarket k /∈ K. These firms form ra-
tional expectations about Q(k), γ(k, `), and γ(k, h). Suppose that skilled workers are better
off by applying to submarket k relative to all of the other active submarkets with the queue
length that allows the unskilled to obtain their market utility U` at k. Then, there would be
a larger inflow of skilled applicants to submarket k. This would reduce the expected utility
obtained at k by the unskilled below U`. As a result, skilled workers would be the only
applicants to these deviating firms. Note that this notion is a natural extension of the sub-
game perfection condition assumed in the competitive search framework with homogeneous
workers.
Characterization of the Equilibrium
Next, the equilibrium allocation is characterized. First, it is shown that an equilibrium
where both types of worker apply to the same vacancies cannot exist. Then, the existence
and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium is proved. All of the proofs are given in the
Appendix.
Consider a submarket k where skilled workers are willing to apply. The following lemma
states that the surplus generated by skilled workers with machines of quality k is larger than
that generated by the unskilled.
Lemma 1 Let k be a submarket such that γ(k, `) ≥ 0, γ(k, h) > 0 and Q(k) > 0. Then,
S`(k) < Sh(k).
From S`(k) < Sh(k), it follows that the firm value obtained from hiring a type ` worker
in this submarket is lower than that when filling the vacancy with a type h worker. As a
result, Lemma 1 partially resembles the monotonicity assumption in Guerrieri, Shimer, and
Wright (2010), according to which the principals (firms) always prefer to trade with higher
types.
Proposition 2 states that workers of different types cannot apply for the same jobs in
equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Surplus as a function of capital
Proposition 2 There is no equilibrium in which workers of different types search for jobs
in the same submarket. Thus, for all active submarkets k ∈ K, either γ(k, `) = 1 and
γ(k, h) = 0, or vice versa.
To understand this result, Figure 1 shows the surplus as a function of capital for each type
of worker. Recall that the surplus has an inverted U-shape in k because of the monotonicity
and concavity of the flow output as well as the linear costs that firms incur when operating.
The previous lemma implies that the skilled surplus stands above its unskilled counterpart
for the subset of capital qualities of interest. If a submarket k1 is active at equilibrium with
γ(k1, `), γ(k1, h) > 0, then committing to capital k
′ arbitrarily above k1 would be a profitable
deviation. By entering submarket k′, firms can eliminate the unskilled applicants, thereby
achieving a discrete jump in profits. This is the case because unskilled workers would need
to be compensated with a higher job-finding rate in k′ relative to k1 due to their surplus fall,
whereas the expected queue length that makes the skilled indifferent is indeed higher in k′
than in k1. Thus, this argument is similar to the sorting assumption in Guerrieri, Shimer,
and Wright (2010), where firms can always find a way to locally increase the utility of the
skilled and make the unskilled worse off to sort them out. However, this sorting assumption
does not hold for a submarket k2 > kh. Note that firms make both types either worse
or better off when deviating from submarket k2. However, the intuition derived from the
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equilibrium definition is that the relative rather than the absolute utility gains and losses
are important. Thus, by deviating to submarket k′ arbitrarily above k2, firms can again
screen out the unskilled because capital-skill complementarity implies that the surplus fall is
relatively larger for the unskilled, and thus they must be compensated with a shorter queue
length to make them indifferent.
As a result, if an equilibrium exists, it must be separating. The existence and uniqueness
of a separating equilibrium is demonstrated. Given the pair (U`, Uh), problem (Ps) s defined
as
sup
q,k
ν(q)αSs(k)
s. to η(q)(1− α)Ss(k) ≥ c0,
ν(q)αS−s(k) ≤ rU−s,
where function Ss is defined by (2). The solution to this problem maximizes the unem-
ployment value of the type s worker subject to firms making non-negative profits, as in the
standard characterization of the competitive search equilibrium allocation. However, the
separating feature of the equilibrium requires one extra constraint. The last inequality is
the non-participation condition for type −s workers because they must have no incentive to
apply to submarket of type s. As is shown in Section V, the non-participation condition for
type h workers in problem (P`) does not bind. Therefore, the problem (P`) can be rewritten
without this constraint. Proposition 3 shows that an equilibrium allocation is a solution of
the set of problems (Ps)s, and vice versa.
Proposition 3 A unique separating equilibrium exists. The equilibrium set of active sub-
markets K ≡ {k`, kh} and the respective queue lengths q` and qh are determined by the
following conditions
k` = k`, (4)
c0 = η(q`)(1− α) F (k`, `)− ck`
r + λ+ αν(q`)
, (5)
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c0 = η(qh)(1− α)F (kh, h)− ckh
r + λ+ αν(qh)
, (6)
and
kh = kh, if ν(qh)αS`(kh) ≤ rU`; (7)
otherwise,
kh > kh and ν(qh)αS`(kh) = rU`. (8)
Proposition 3 states that a unique equilibrium exists. There are two possible types of
equilibrium allocations, which are shown in Figure 2. In both submarkets, firm entry is
determined by the corresponding zero-profit conditions (5) and (6). We plot the firms’
zero-profit curves and the indifference curves for unemployed workers. Lemma 1 and the
zero-profit condition imply that the zero-profit curve for skilled workers remains above that
of its unskilled counterpart if the skilled are willing to apply to the submarket in question.
Likewise, the capital-skill complementarity assumption is a single-crossing property, and thus
the indifference curves cross only once.
First, consider the case of unskilled workers. According to equilibrium condition (4),
unskilled workers apply to the submarket characterized by the machine quality k`. This result
is intuitive because k` maximizes the surplus created by a match with an unskilled worker,
and both firms and unskilled workers benefit from the maximum surplus. Graphically, the
equilibrium allocation corresponds to the tangency point between the zero-profit curve and
the indifference curve because the non-participation condition does not bind in the unskilled
case. In other words, unskilled workers sign up for the same job offer, as in the scenario with
no informational frictions.
Next the skilled submarket is considered. First, if unskilled workers are not willing to
apply to submarket kh, firms that target skilled workers aim to maximize the surplus from
the match. Similar to the unskilled case, this allocation corresponds to the tangency point
depicted in the left panel of Figure 2. This equilibrium allocation coincides with that with
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Figure 2: The two possible separating equilibrium allocations.
perfect information and type-contingent offers. Second, if the non-participation condition
in problem (Ph) binds, condition (8) implies that the equilibrium capital kh > kh. The
right panel of Figure 2 shows this second case. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson
(1977), and Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), this is the minimum cost required to screen
out unskilled applicants because it makes them indifferent with respect to the equilibrium
submarket k`. The forgone welfare is accounted for by the capital difference kh − kh, which
we refer to in the following as over-investment, and the firm entry difference. Likewise, the
forgone expected wages can be treated as the burden created by the presence of unskilled
workers on the skilled. This result agrees with Moen (2003) and Moen and Rosen (2005).
The result showing the existence of a separating equilibrium is not new and it relies on
the matching frictions as well as the capital-skill complementarity assumption. In particu-
lar, since screening out unskilled workers may require skilled agents to forgo some of their
potential returns to matching, a deviation by firms (to a pooling submarket) that leads to a
reduction in these forgone returns might be tempting and it could break the separating equi-
librium. This was the case described in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). However, similar to
Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010), these deviations are not profitable in the present case.
To understand this, we simply need to determine what type of applicants might apply to
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the deviating firms in a submarket k′ ∈ (kh, kh). Note that unskilled workers are indifferent
between equilibrium submarket k` and kh, i.e., the queue length qh and capital kh maximize
the search value of both types. Therefore, we need to determine who benefits the most from
applying to submarket k′. By differentiating expression (1) with respect to k and evaluating
it at kh, we obtain:
∂qs
∂k
|k=kh =
ν(qh)
ν ′(qh)
−Fk(kh, s) + c
Ss(kh)(r + λ) , for s ∈ {`, h}. (9)
Lemma 1 implies that S`(kh) < Sh(kh). Furthermore, Fk(kh, `) − c < Fk(kh, h) − c < 0
due to capital skill complementarity. As a result, 0 > ∂qh
∂k
|k=kh > ∂q`∂k |k=kh when deviating to
k′. Thus, the skilled workers benefit the least (their surplus increases relatively less) if they
apply to submarket k′. Therefore, the queue length must increase relatively less to make
them indifferent with respect to kh. As a result, only the unskilled apply to the deviating
submarket k′; hence, this cannot be a profitable deviation.
What leads to over-investment? As described above, we showed that over-investment
(kh − kh) can occur at equilibrium. This result is interesting because it is an inefficient
outcome, as is shown in the online Appendix. Some of the key forces that underlie over-
investment are now considered.
Proposition 3 states that type h firms over-invest in machine quality at equilibrium if
and only if the unskilled are better off searching for a job with machine quality kh. Thus,
over-investment occurs at equilibrium if and only
ν(qh)S`(kh) > ν(q`)S`(k`), (10)
where qs is defined by the equation c0 = η(qs)(1 − α)F (ks,s)−cksr+λ+αν(qs) . As Proposition 5 states
below, this may not be the case because of higher wages, but instead because of the more
job opportunities workers have in the skilled submarket. Whether this inequality holds or
not depends on the functional forms and the parameter values. In particular, it depends
on the skill difference, the capital elasticity of the production function, and the job-finding
probability function. The following lemma states that firms over-invest at equilibrium if the
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Figure 3: The equilibrium condition for over-investment for an economy with Cobb–Douglas
production technology and an urn-ball matching function.
skill difference is sufficiently small because the potential employment gains from applying
for type h jobs are of a higher order than the associated wage losses.4
Lemma 4 Over-investment occurs at equilibrium if the skill difference is sufficiently small.
More generally, Figure 3 illustrates the case for a Cobb–Douglas production technology,
F (k, a) = kσa1−σ, where σ ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ {a`, ah} denotes the market skills of the employee,
and a Cobb–Douglas matching function, ν(q) = qα−1. We obtain ks = as
(
σ
c
) 1
1−σ , for s ∈
{`, h}. The machine quality ks increases with the skills and decreases with the operating
cost, whereas the effects of the capital elasticity σ are uncertain. Condition (10) becomes
ν(qh)(r + λ) + αν(q`)ν(qh)
ν(q`)(r + λ) + αν(q`)ν(qh)
F (kh, `)− ckh
F (k`, `)− ck`
> 1. (11)
The first factor in this expression is greater than 1 because skilled jobs are relatively more
abundant, whereas the second factor is lower than 1 because k` is the surplus-maximizing
level. Whether or not this product is above 1 depends on the parameter values. Figure 3 plots
this product for several values of the skill difference ah − a` and capital elasticity σ. Over-
investment occurs mostly for low values of the capital elasticity and skill differences. Our
4The authors thank a referee for drawing our attention to this point.
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intuition regarding capital elasticity is that the wage penalization associated with applying
for jobs of quality kh increases as the firms’ reaction through the capital margin becomes
more important. Furthermore, the occurrence of over-investment at equilibrium is generally
not monotonic in the skill difference, as shown for σ = 0.6.
V Exit Rates and Re-employment Wages
The equilibrium outcomes are now considered, particularly the dynamics of the exit rates
from unemployment and re-employment wages over the unemployment duration. All of the
proofs are given in the Appendix.
After matching, the wages are Nash-bargained. Let α denote the bargaining power of
the worker. In the Appendix, the equilibrium wages are derived, which are
ws = α
(
F (ks, s)− cks
)
+ (1− α)rUs. (12)
In addition to their continuation value of unemployment, workers obtain a share α of
the surplus. The following proposition states that skilled workers have better employment
prospects on all dimensions compared with their unskilled counterparts.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium machine quality, job-finding rate, surplus, unemployment
value, and wage are higher for skilled workers.
The returns obtained by skilled workers from searching in the type ` submarket are
strictly lower than the returns from searching in the skilled submarket. Therefore, the
non-participation constraint in problem (P`) does not bind, as had been speculated when
characterizing the equilibrium allocation. By contrast, unskilled workers face a trade-off
when considering whether to apply for skilled jobs. First, skilled jobs are relatively more
abundant, and second, the net output produced by operating with a machine quality is above
k`, and thus wages are lower. Firms that target skilled workers use the capital margin to
discourage unskilled workers from applying, if necessary. This may imply that there is a
18
burden on skilled workers in terms of excessive capital, but their employment prospects are
always relatively better.
Wage differences. The equilibrium wage difference can be derived from expression (12).
Note that wage differences among observationally identical workers are not derived simply
from differences in the worker unobservable characteristics. An amplification mechanism
occurs at equilibrium due to the reaction of ex-ante identical profit-maximizing firms to
worker differences. First, firms commit to a higher machine quality to attract (only) skilled
workers. Second, the expected returns from posting vacancies in the skilled submarket
outweigh those in the unskilled submarket, so firm entry is greater in the former. As a result,
the exit rates from unemployment, and thus the outside options of the skilled workers, are
higher.
Dynamics over the duration of unemployment. The steady state unemployment
rate of workers of type s ∈ {`, h} is determined by
us =
λ
λ+ ν(qs)
. (13)
Proposition 5 implies that the unemployment rate of skilled workers is lower. The dynamics
of the equilibrium variables over the duration of unemployment are now investigated. Let
the length of an unemployment spell be denoted by τ ∈ (0,∞). The average job-finding rate
at duration τ is derived as the ratio of the mass of workers who find a job immediately after
a period of length τ relative to the total mass of unemployed for a period of this length.
The average wage for new matches conditional on an unemployment period of length τ is
obtained in an analogous manner.
Proposition 6 The average job-finding rates and re-employment wages decline with the
duration of unemployment, and they flatten out for long periods. If µ(h) ≤ 0.5, then the rate
at which exit rates fall also declines with duration.
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Proposition 6 states that these two variables decline over an unemployment period despite
constant individual rates and wages. This falling trend is due to a pure sorting effect.
Ex-ante differences across workers affect output directly. Due to the performance-related
pay schemes, firms can separate different types of workers into different submarkets by
committing to an input that is complementary in terms of production to the workers skills.
Skilled workers are more likely to exit unemployment as well as obtaining higher wages.
Therefore, the average worker is more likely to be unskilled when the unemployment duration
is longer. Two other implications are derived from the pure sorting mechanism. First, both
the average exit rates and re-employment wages flatten out for sufficiently long periods.
Second, because they are functions of the unemployment duration, these variables are either
convex or they begin as concave and then become convex after some duration, where the
inflection point depends on the parameter values. In particular, a sufficient condition for the
rate of the decline of the exit rate to decrease steadily over the duration of unemployment
is that the mass of skilled workers is less than half of the total population in the economy.
The empirical evidence for exit rates is robust in terms of these three features: they fall
with the duration of unemployment at a declining rate, and flatten out for long spells, e.g.,
see Shimer (2008) and Farber and Valletta (2013). A number of studies have established
the negative relationship between re-employment wages and unemployment duration, e.g.,
see Addison, Portugal, and Centeno (2004) and Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Preugschat (2014).
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no clear evidence for wages regarding the
other two features.
Although alternative mechanisms may also be consistent with the empirical falling trends
in these two variables, they may be at odds with the decreasing decline in exit rates. For
example, although little is known about the precise process that rules the depreciation of
human capital over the duration of unemployment, in Machin and Manning (1999), it was
stated that: “an educated guess might be that productivity falls slowly initially but there
is then a period in which deterioration is rather rapid and then it bottoms out.” Under
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this assumption, the exit rates and re-employment wages will follow productivity. A similar
pattern is likely to occur if the mechanism at work is the deterioration of the social network
of an unemployed worker, e.g., see Figure 6 in Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
Positive Assortative Matching and Wages
The unobserved heterogeneity explanation is consistent with both falling exit rates and
wages over the duration of unemployment if the workers who leave unemployment sooner
also obtain higher wages. Therefore, PAM is a key equilibrium outcome. However, it is a
robust result in previous research into assignment, where capital-skill complementarity is not
sufficient to produce PAM in a frictional economy. In a random search framework, Shimer
and Smith (2000) showed that PAM requires log-supermodularity. Eeckhout and Kircher
(2010) found that a weaker (root-supermodularity) condition is necessary and sufficient for
PAM in a competitive search economy. Shi (2001) also demonstrated that fairly strong
complementarity is needed in a world closer to ours, but where there is perfect information
about worker types and firms differentiate themselves by investing in capital, which is a
sunk cost at the meeting stage. The requirement for strong complementarity in competitive
search models is due to the trade-off between the complementarity in production and the
complementarity in securing the match. Thus, high-value workers (buyers) find that it is
optimal at equilibrium to match with low value firms (sellers) if there is no complementarity
in production (trade). This is the case because the former accept a low wage (high price) to
increase the matching chances, whereas the latter are more willing to make business through
wages (prices) at the risk of remaining idle. Simple supermodularity is not sufficient to
outweigh these preferences.
The fundamental difference in our setting is that the sunk costs c0 do not depend on the
machine quality to which firms commit and the operating costs c are only incurred if the
job is filled.5 To understand this, we consider the perfect information scenario analyzed in
5As stated in the Introduction, capital is treated as any input that is complementary in production to
worker skills such as co-worker skills, machine quality, or the quantity and quality of intermediate goods.
Therefore, the associated costs are variable instead of fixed. However, because of its centrality, alternative
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Shi (2001), but with our cost assumptions. The capital decision is then determined by the
first order condition Fk(k, s) = c. It follows that capital-skill complementarity is sufficient
to obtain PAM because of the assumption that the cost scheme breaks the link between
machine quality and search decisions. Thus, there are no high or low type firms ex-ante, but
there are different match values ex-post, and the capital decision maximizes the joint value of
the worker-firm pair. Clearly, adverse selection may restore the link between capital and the
search for skilled jobs. However, in this case, Proposition 3 states that the machine quality
is always higher for skilled jobs to prevent unskilled workers from applying, and Proposition
5 shows that private information does not reverse the order for exit rates and wages.
VI Conclusions
This paper models a sorting mechanism based on adverse selection to explain the declining
exit rates from unemployment and re-employment wages over the duration of unemployment.
The central assumptions of our model are as follows. First, workers are informed privately
about their skills. Second, recruiting firms can commit to an input (e.g., capital) that is
complementary in terms of production with worker skills. Third, firms have the ability to
set performance-related pay schemes. Fourth, the search is directed.
In this setting, different types of workers search for a job in different submarkets at
equilibrium. Skilled workers look for jobs with higher machine quality, experience more job
opportunities, and obtain higher wages than their unskilled counterparts, i.e., a separating
equilibrium exists with PAM. Therefore, both the average exit rate from unemployment
and the entry wage fall with the duration of unemployment because the composition of the
pool of unemployed workers deteriorates over time. Furthermore, separating worker types
may be costly, where firms that target skilled workers may have to over-invest in order to
discourage applications from unskilled workers. In this case, the equilibrium allocation is
not constrained efficient.
cost schemes are studied in the online appendix.
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Another interpretation of the sorting explanation is that firms observe the applicant’s
type and base their recruiting decision on this information. However, if a worker’s type is
not contractible, our results would still hold in this alternative setting.
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Appendix
Surplus and Wage Determination.
To determine wages as a Nash-bargaining solution, we need to add some details to our
setting. A type s employed worker obtains the flow wage ws(k) and becomes displaced at
rate λ. The employment value is defined as
rEs(k) = ws(k) + λ
(
Us − Es(k)
)
. (A1)
Analogously, the value of a filled vacancy is determined by the following functional equation.
rJs(k) = F (k, s)− ck − ws(k)− λJs(k) (A2)
The net surplus is defined as Ss(k) ≡ Js(k) + Es(k) − Us. Using the above expressions for
the value functions, the functional equation (2) for the surplus value function is obtained.
After matching, a firm and a worker set the wage through Nash-bargaining. Let α denote
the bargaining power of the worker. The equilibrium wage is the solution of the following
problem.
max
w
(Es(k)− Us)α (Js(k)− V )1−α (A3)
This solution is characterized by Js(k) = (1−α)Ss(k). By using the latter equation to replace
the value Js in the above Bellman equation (A2), it is concluded that the equilibrium wages
are determined as
ws(k) = α
(
F (k, s)− ck)+ (1− α)rUs. (A4)
Thus, workers obtain a proportion α and firms receive the remaining 1− α of the surplus of
the match, in addition to the unemployment value rUs.
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a submarket k such that γ(k, `) ≥ 0, γ(k, h) > 0, and
Q(k) > 0. Using the functional equations (1) and (2), the following expression is obtained.
(r + λ+ αν(Q(k))) (Sh(k)− S`(k)) ≥ F (k, h)− F (k, `) (A5)
The right-hand side of this inequality is strictly positive because skilled workers are more
productive. Therefore, the surplus gap is positive, Sh(k) > S`(k).‖
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Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is obtained by contradiction. Suppose that there is
an equilibrium where a submarket k is active and γ(k, `), γ(k, h) > 0. According to Lemma
1, S`(k) < Sh(k). Both types of workers enter submarket k, so we have
rUs = αν(Q(k))Ss(k), for s ∈ {`, h}. (A6)
The expected profits of firms are defined by expression (3) and the average ex-post profits
across worker types.
Consider now the alternative submarket k′, where k′ ≡ k +  and  are arbitrarily small
and positive. By differentiating expression (A6) with respect to k, we obtain
∂qs
∂k
=
ν(Q(k))
ν ′(Q(k))
−(Fk(k, s)− c)
Ss(k)(r + λ) , for s ∈ {`, k}, (A7)
where ∂qs
∂k
measures how much the queue length needs to change to keep a worker of type s
indifferent between submarkets k and k′. The above expression considers that
(r + λ)
dSs(k)
dk
= Fk(k, s)− c. (A8)
The capital-skill complementarity assumption implies that dS`(k)
dk
< dSh(k)
dk
. Recall that ν
is a decreasing function. Consider two cases, as follows.
Case 1: Suppose that k ∈ [k`, kh]. Then, −(Fk(k, h)−c) ≤ 0 ≤ −(Fk(k, `)−c). Therefore,
∂qh
∂k
≥ 0 ≥ ∂q`
∂k
, with has at least one strict inequality. Unlike the skilled workers, unskilled
workers must be compensated with a higher job-finding rate to make them indifferent between
k and k′.
Case 2: Suppose now that kh < k. Then, 0 < −(Fk(k, h)−c) < −(Fk(k, `)−c). It follows
that ∂q`
∂k
< ∂qh
∂k
< 0. The queue length must decrease more for unskilled workers so they are
indifferent between k and k′.
In both cases, firms that deviate to submarket k′ achieve a discrete jump in profits because
low-ability workers do not apply to k′ and S`(k) < Sh(k). Therefore, we find a contradiction
in either case; hence, submarket k cannot be active at equilibrium.‖
Proof of the Existence of the Equilibrium.
We proceed according to several steps. First, we focus on the necessary conditions that
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the equilibrium allocation must satisfy for type ` workers and we then consider the skilled.
Second, we establish that these conditions are also sufficient and we state the existence of
an equilibrium.
First, we state and prove the following result.
Claim 7 Let k be a submarket such that either γ(k, `) > 0 or γ(k, h) > 0. Then,∑
s
γ(k, s)(1− α)Ss(k) ≥ (1− α)S`(k). (A9)
Proof Expression (A9) is equivalent to
(1− γ(k, `))Sh(k) ≥ (1− γ(k, `))S`(k). (A10)
We analyze two cases. If γ(k, `) = 1, then expression (A10) holds with equality. Otherwise,
if γ(k, `) < 1, then the inequality holds because of Lemma 1.‖
Now, we consider problem (P`).
Proposition 8 Let {G,K,Q,Γ, {Us,Ss}s} be an equilibrium. If an active submarket k` ∈ K
exists such that q` ≡ Q(k`) > 0 and γ(k`, `) > 0, then the vector (q`, k`) is the unique solution
of problem (P`) and the system of equations (4) and (5).
Proof First, it is shown that for any k ∈ K such that q` ≡ Q(k) > 0 and γ(k, `) > 0, the
pair (q`,S`(k)) solves the following problem (A11). Then, we prove that the solution of the
problem is uniquely characterized by conditions (4) and (5):
max
q∈[0,∞],S∈[0,S]
ν(q)S (A11)
s. to η(q)(1− α)S ≥ c0,
where S ≡ maxk′ S`(k′) is the maximum surplus. First, note that Weierstrass Theorem
appliesto ensure the existence of a solution to this maximization problem; therefore, it is
well-defined. Similarly, Proposition 2 ensures that if k is an active submarket such that
γ(k, `) > 0, then γ(k, `) = 1. As a result, the second equilibrium condition implies that the
constraint on problem (A11) evaluated for the pair (q`,S`(k)) holds with equality. We prove
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that this is a maximizer by contradiction. Suppose that (q′, S ′) ∈ [0,∞]× [0, S] exists such
that ν(q′)αS ′ > ν(q`)αS`(k), and η(q′)(1 − α)S ′ ≥ c0. The continuity, monotonicity, and
concavity of the value function S` are inherited from the production technology. Further, the
surplus reaches its maximum at k`; hence, S = S`(k`). By continuity, k′ ∈ [0, k`] must exist
such that S`(k′) = S ′. By the definition of the equilibrium beliefs, Q(k′) ≥ q′. Therefore,
η(Q(k′))
∑
s
γ(k′, s)(1− α)Ss(k′) ≥ η(Q(k′))(1− α)S`(k′) > η(q′)(1− α)S`(k′) ≥ c0,
where the first inequality comes from Claim 7, and the second inequality results from the
monotonicity of function η. This implies that a deviation to submarket k′ would be profitable.
This contradicts the assumption that k is an active submarket in equilibrium; therefore, the
pair (q`,S`(k)) is a solution to the problem (A11).
Now, we exploit the fact that the constraint must hold with equality to rewrite the
problem (A11) as
max
q∈[b,∞]
1/q,
where η(b) equals c0
(1−α)S . Thus, the maximizer q is b, and k must be k`. Thus, conditions
(4) and (5) hold at equilibrium, and the solution to the problem (P`) is unique. ‖
Now, consider the problem (Ph).
Proposition 9 Let {G,K,Q,Γ, {Us,Ss}s} be an equilibrium. Consider an active submarket
kh such that qh ≡ Q(kh) > 0 and γ(kh, h) > 0, then the equilibrium vector (qh, kh) is the
unique solution to the problem (Ph) given U`, which must satisfy the following conditions:
c0 = η(q)(1− α) F (k, h)− ck
r + λ+ αν(q)
(A12)
and
k = kh, if ν(q)αS`(k) ≤ rU`; (A13)
otherwise,
k > kh and ν(q)αS`(k) = rU`. (A14)
Proof First, arguing by contradiction, it is shown that for any active submarket k ∈ K such
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that q ≡ Q(k) > 0 and γ(k, h) > 0, the vector (q, k) solves problem (Ph) given the value U`.
Proposition 2 ensures that if k is such that γ(k, h) > 0, then γ(k, h) = 1. As a result, the
second equilibrium condition implies that the first constraint on problem (Ph) holds with
equality. The third equilibrium condition ensures that the second constraint also holds given
the equilibrium value U` when evaluated for the pair (q, k). Therefore, the pair (q, k) belongs
to the constraint set. Now, suppose that (q′, k′) exists such that ν(q′)αSh(k′) > ν(q)αSh(k),
and the two constraints on problem (Ph) hold. ν is an decreasing continuous function, so
q˜ > q′ must exist such that ν(q˜)αSh(k′) = ν(q)αSh(k). By the definition of the equilibrium
beliefs, Q(k′) ≥ q˜. Therefore, the type-` workers must be strictly worse off in submarket k′
because ν(Q(k′))αS`(k′) < ν(q′)αS`(k′) ≤ rU`, and it follows that γ(k′, `) = 0. Therefore,
η(Q(k′))
∑
s
γ(k′, s)(1− α)Ss(k′) = η(Q(k′))(1− α)Sh(k′) > η(q′)(1− α)Sh(k′) ≥ c0
This result contradicts the assumption that submarket k is active in equilibrium because the
deviation of a firm to submarket k′ would be profitable. Thus, the equilibrium pair (q, k) is
a solution to problem (Ph).
Now, the existence and uniqueness of a solution to Problem (Ph) is demonstrated. Due
to the continuity of the objective function and the compactness of the constraint set of the
problem, the Weierstrass Theorem is applied to ensure the existence of a solution. Indeed,
the constraint set is non-empty because the pair q = ∞ and k = kh (for example) satisfies
both constraints.
Later, it is shown that any solution satisfies the first constraint with equality. Then,
by using the constraint to replace the surplus from the objective function, as in the proof
of Proposition 8, the problem can be rewritten as maximizing function 1/q subject to the
two constraints on problem (Ph). Therefore, the maximizer is the minimum feasible queue
length. Hence, a unique solution exists for q and k. It is straightforward to show that the
solution k must be greater than k`; otherwise, we would obtain a contradiction by increasing
k by an arbitrarily small amount. This is the case because it can be argued along the same
lines as the proof of Lemma 1 that Sh(k) > S`(k).
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To characterize the solution of problem (Ph), we define the Lagrangian as
L = ν(q)αSh(k) + ξ1 (η(q)(1− α)Sh(k)− c0)− ξ2 (ν(q)αS`(k)− rU`) ,
where ξ1 and ξ2 denote the non-negative multipliers associated with the first and second
constraints, respectively. The Kuhn Tucker (necessary) conditions are
ν ′(q)α (Sh(k)− ξ2S`(k)) + ξ1η′(q)(1− α)Sh(k) ≤ 0, q ≥ 0 (A15)
and qν ′(q)α (Sh(k)− ξ2S`(k)) + qξ1η′(q)(1− α)Sh(k) = 0.
dSh(k)
dk
(ν(q)α + ξ1η(q)(1− α))− ξ2ν(q)αdS`(k)dk ≤ 0, k ≥ 0 (A16)
and k dSh(k)
dk
(ν(q)α + ξ1η(q)(1− α))− kξ2ν(q)αdS`(k)dk = 0.
η(q)(1− α)Sh(k) ≥ c0, ξ1 ≥ 0 and ξ1 [η(q)(1− α)Sh(k)− c0] = 0. (A17)
ν(q)αS`(k) ≤ rU`, ξ2 ≥ 0 and ξ2 [ν(q)αS`(k)− rU`] = 0. (A18)
This set of complementary slackness conditions allows the characterization of the solution to
the problem. The case where ξ2 = 0 is analogous to that studied in the proof of Proposition
8, i.e., k = kh and the necessary condition (A12) holds. Furthermore, the second constraint
on the problem (Ph) must also hold for the solution pair (q, x).
Now, suppose that ξ2 > 0, then the second constraint must be binding according to the
complementary slackness condition (A18). This implies that q ∈ (0,∞). Next, it is shown
by contradiction that the first constraint also cannot be slack in this case. Suppose that
ξ1 = 0 and η(q)(1−α)Sh(k) > c0. It follows from condition (A15) that Sh(k) = ξ2S`(k), and
from condition (A16), we obtain dSh(k)
dk
= ξ2
dS`(k)
dk
. As we argued above, k > k`, so
dS`(k)
dk
< 0
implies that dSh(k)
dk
< 0 and ξ2 < 1. Therefore, Sh(k) < S`(k), which is not true. As a result,
condition (A12) holds. Finally, the necessary condition (A16) together with dS`(k)
dk
< 0 leads
to dSh(k)
dk
< 0, i.e., k > kh.‖
Now, it is shown that a solution to the set of problems (Ps)s participates in an equilibrium
allocation, and the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation is proven. The
proof of Proposition 3 then follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.
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Let (qs, ks) be the vector solution of problem (Ps), where Ss(ks) = F (ks,s)−cksr+λ+αν(qs) and rUs =
ν(qs)αSs(ks). We prove that it participates in an equilibrium allocation. An equilibrium is
a tuple {G,K,Q,Γ, {Us,Ss}s} that satisfies the equilibrium definition.
We define K ≡ {k`, kh}. The surplus function is determined by the functional equation
(2) and the above unemployment values. The remaining equilibrium objects are set in a
manner consistent with the equilibrium definition:
dGψ(k) ≡

(1− µ)u`/q`, if k = k`
µuh/qh, if k = kh
0, otherwise,
where us ≡ λλ+ν(qs) . By construction, the distribution G trivially ensures that the last
equilibrium condition holds. The beliefs for all off-the-equilibrium k are defined as
Q(k) ≡ max
s
qˆs(k),
γ(k, `) =

1, if qˆ`(k) > qˆh(k)
0, otherwise
, and γ(k, h) =

1, if qˆh(k) ≥ qˆ`(k)
0, otherwise,
where
qˆs(k) ≡

q such that ν(q)αSs(k) = rUs, if Ss(k) > 0
0, otherwise.
Note that the beliefs are well defined given the assumptions on the matching function ν
and there is no submarket k such that both types of workers enter simultaneously.
Next, it isshown that firms maximize their profits, which are zero at equilibrium in all
active submarkets. It is then proven that workers search optimally for jobs.
The proofs of Propositions 8 and 9 show that the free entry condition holds in each active
submarket. By contradiction, it is proven that firms maximize their profits by entering either
of the active submarkets in K. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that a submarket k′ exists such that Q(k′) > 0, γ(k′, `) = 1 and
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η(Q(k′))(1−α)S`(k′) > c0. To attract unskilled workers, it must be the case that ν(Q(k′))αS`(k′) =
rU`. Because of the continuity and monotonicity of function η, q
′ < Q(k′) exists such that
η(q′)(1− α)S`(k′) = c0. ν is a decreasing function of the queue length, so it follows that
ν(q`)αS`(k`) = ν(Q(k′))αS`(k′) < ν(q′)αS`(k′),
which contradicts the assumption that (q`, k`) is the maximizer of problem (P`). Therefore,
there is no profitable deviation that attracts only unskilled workers.
Case 2. Suppose that a submarket k′ exists such that Q(k′) > 0, γ(k′, h) = 1, and
η(Q(k′))(1− α)Sh(k′) > c0. Skilled workers enter the submarket if
ν(Q(k′))αSh(k′) = rUh = ν(qh)αSh(kh).
Furthermore, the next inequality follows from the off-the-equilibrium beliefs defined above,
ν(Q(k′))αS`(k′) ≤ rU`.
We distinguish two sub-cases. First, if the latter inequality is strict, then q′ < Q(k′) must
exist such that the two constraints on problem (Ph) hold at (q
′, k′). Due to the properties
of the matching technology, it isfound that ν(q′)(1 − α)Sh(k′) > rUh, which contradicts
the assumption that (qh, kh) is the maximizer of problem (Ph). Second, if the inequality is
indeed an equality, then it can be argued along the same lines as the proof of Proposition
2 that a submarket k′′ exists, which differs from k′ by an arbitrarily small amount, such
that the first constraint on problem (Ph) holds, the second holds with strict inequality, and
ν(Q(k′′))(1− α)Sh(k′′) = rUh, which leads us back to the first case.
It remains to be demonstrated that the equilibrium condition that workers search opti-
mally. This is the case by the construction of the equilibrium expectations functions.‖
Proof of Lemma 4.
Let U˜` ≡ ν(qs)αS`(ks) denote the expected discounted utility of a type ` worker con-
ditional on applying to submarket (ks, qs). This pair is uniquely defined by the system of
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equations
η(qs)(1− α)
F (ks, s)− cks
r + λ+ αν(qs)
= c0
Fk(k, s) = c.
The second equation determines a unique capital level ks as a function of type s, so we
plug this into the first condition to obtain a single equation, which relates qs and s. By
differentiating this with respect to s, we obtain
dqs
ds
= − g(qs)
g′(qs)
d
(
F (ks,s)−cks
)
ds
F (ks, s)− cks
< 0, (A19)
where g(q) ≡ η(q)
r+λ+αν(q)
is increasing in q. This derivative is negative because of the capital-
skill complementarity.
To investigate the effects of an arbitrarily small skill difference on U˜`(s), we evaluate the
total derivative at s = `, where
dU˜`
ds
=
∂U˜`
∂qs
dqs
ds
+
∂U˜`
∂ks
dks
ds
= ν ′(qs)αS`(ks)
dqs
ds
+ ν(qs)
∂S`(ks)
∂ks
dks
ds
.
Note that the last term vanishes as ∂S`(ks)
∂ks
= 0 when evaluated at k`. Therefore, the total
derivative is positive and unskilled workers are better off applying for a type h job if firms
do not over-invest when the skill differences are sufficiently small.‖
Proof of Proposition 5. Conditions (4)–(5) and (A12)-(A14) characterize the equilibrium
outcome. According to these equilibrium conditions, it is always the case that k` < kh.
The conditions can be rewritten (4) and (A12) as
η(q`)S`(k`) = η(qh)Sh(kh). (A20)
If kh = kh, then this expression can be written as g(q`)
(
F (k`, `)−ck`
)
= g(qh)
(
F (kh, h)−ckh
)
,
where g is an increasing function. The properties of the production technology ensure that
F (k`, `) − ck` < F (kh, h) − ckh. Therefore, q` > qh. Otherwise, if kh > kh, then condition
(A14) holds. As S`(kh) < S`(k`), it follows that q` > qh.
The queue length gap together with expression (A20) imply that S`(k`) < Sh(kh). Then,
it follows directly from the definition of the unemployment value (1) that U` < Uh. Finally,
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by manipulating the wage and surplus equations, we can write the wages as ws =
(
r + λ +
ν(qs)
)
αSs(ks), and thus w` < wh.‖
Proof of Proposition 6.
A type s worker is unemployed for an exact period of length τ with probability e−τν(qs)ν(qs).
The average exit rate from unemployment at duration τ amounts to:
ν(τ) =
µuhe
−τν(qh)ν(qh) + (1− µ)u`e−τν(q`)ν(q`)
µuhe−τν(qh) + (1− µ)u`e−τν(q`) . (A21)
We can proceed in an analogous manner for the average re-employment wage at duration τ .
The average wage for new matches conditional on an unemployment period of length τ is
determined by:
w(τ) =
µuhe
−τν(qh)ν(qh)wh + (1− µ)u`e−τν(q`)ν(q`)w`
µuhe−τν(qh)ν(qh) + (1− µ)u`e−τν(q`)ν(q`) . (A22)
Next, we show the steps for the average exit rate but we skip the proofs for the average
wages because they are analogous.
First, we differentiate expression (A21) with respect to the duration to obtain
dν(τ)
dτ
= −x
(
ν(qh)− ν(q`)
)2
eτ(ν(qh)−ν(q`))(
1 + xeτ(ν(qh)−ν(q`))
)2 ,
where x ≡ 1−µ
µ
u`
uh
. According to Proposition 5, the derivate is negative and thus the average
exit rate falls over the unemployment period. To show that this variable flattens out for long
spells, it is sufficient to compute the limit of the derivative as τ goes to infinity.
lim
τ→∞
dν(τ)
dτ
= lim
z→∞
− z
(1 + xz)2
= 0.
Finally, to analyze the curvature of the average exit rate, the second derivative is computed.
d2ν(τ)
dτ 2
=
(
ν(qh)− ν(q`)
)2(
xeτ(ν(qh)−ν(q`)) − 1)(
1 + xeτ(ν(qh)−ν(q`))
)3
The second derivative is positive if and only if eτ(ν(qh)−ν(q`)) > 1/x. Therefore, there is one
inflection point at most. A sufficient condition that the average exit rate is always convex is
µ ≤ 0.5.‖
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